Weak Content-Security-Policy Configuration
This page tracks remediation of a finding from Chipp's independent penetration test. It is a transparency record, not a claim that the issue is resolved. Remediation is in progress and has not yet been validated in production.
What this finding is
A Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header tells the browser which sources of scripts, styles, images, and other resources it should trust. An independent penetration test of build.chipp.ai found that the deployed CSP was limited to a single directive (frame-ancestors 'self'), without broader restrictions on script, style, connection, or form-submission sources.
Why it matters
A narrow or missing CSP does not, by itself, create a vulnerability, but it removes an important defense-in-depth layer against client-side injection attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). A strong CSP limits the damage an attacker could do even if another part of the application had an injection flaw.
Assessment details
- Affected surface
- build.chipp.ai
- Assessment period
- June 24-30, 2026
- Report date
- 2026-06-30
- CWE / OWASP mapping
- CWE-693 · OWASP A02:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
Remediation objective
Ship a strict, comprehensive Content-Security-Policy across build.chipp.ai that restricts script, style, image, font, connection, object, base-uri, and form-action sources to trusted origins, removing reliance on the single frame-ancestors directive.
Technical approach
- Define default-src 'self' as the baseline, with explicit script-src, style-src, img-src, font-src, and connect-src allowlists.
- Set object-src 'none', base-uri 'self', and form-action 'self' to close common CSP bypass vectors.
- Avoid 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval'; use nonces or hashes for any inline script/style that cannot be externalized.
- Apply the policy at the edge (Cloudflare Worker) so it is enforced consistently for every response.
- Validate the shipped policy with browser developer tools, an automated scanner pass, and targeted regression tests before declaring it production-verified.
Validation criteria & evidence checklist
- Production header capture confirms the strict CSP is present on build.chipp.ai responses.
- Automated regression tests cover the CSP header value and fail the build if it regresses.
- A scanner-equivalent verification (e.g. OWASP ZAP / Nuclei re-scan) no longer flags a weak or missing CSP.
- Browser smoke tests confirm the application still functions correctly under the stricter policy (no broken scripts, styles, or embeds).
- Dated deployment/commit references are recorded once the fix ships to production.
- Residual risk, if any, is documented (e.g. any narrowly-scoped exception and why it remains necessary).
Update history
- 2026-06-30
Finding reported by independent penetration test (Advantage Partners) covering the June 24-30, 2026 assessment window.
- 2026-06-30
Public transparency page published. Status: remediation in progress. Technical remediation tracked internally; not yet implemented or validated in production.
Trust Center & contact
For the full picture of Chipp's security program, visit our canonical Trust Center↗. Detailed reports and additional evidence may be available through the Trust Center's request-access process; this page does not claim that a specific private resource is currently listed there.
Questions about this finding? Contact us or email security@chipp.ai.